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Abstract 
The world requires global solutions. What is the right approach? Since the end of the Bush 
administration there has been an international debate on what kind of world will emerge. 
Where is Europe in this debate? Among American academics Europe plays only a marginal 
role. Their main concerns are the decline of America and the rise of China. Europe is not 
considered to be a major power factor in the new world. The “Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership” (TTIP) introduced a new element into the debate, however. For 
liberal internationalists the TTIP could provide a stable basis for market economies and 
liberal democracies to strengthen their global influence. Such an agreement could help to 
enlarge their standards to the emerging powers. On the one hand, it would pull them into 
the new system. On the other hand, it would push them towards it. The US and Europe 
would create an economic and politically unifying force that would integrate the new 
emerging actors such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and other established economic powers. 
Geo-strategists and Realists would argue that closer US – European ties, the TIPP together 
with the “Transpacific Partnership” (TPP), would enhance the West’s leverage with China. 
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Introduction 
The world requires global solutions. What is the right approach? Since the end of the Bush 
administration there has been an international debate on what kind of world will emerge. 
Where is Europe in this debate? Among American academics Europe plays only a marginal 
role. Their main concerns are the decline of America and the rise of China. Europe is not 
considered to be a major power factor in the new world. In the best case Europe is seen as a 
natural ally because it consists of market economies and liberal democracies. In the worst 
case it is seen as irrelevant because it lacks military capacities with global reach. The 
“Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” (TTIP) introduced a new element into the 
debate, however. For liberal internationalists the TTIP could provide a stable basis for 
market economies and liberal democracies to strengthen their global influence. Such an 
agreement could help to enlarge their standards to the emerging powers. On the one hand, 
it would pull them into the new system. On the other hand, it would push them towards it. 
The US and Europe would create an economic and politically unifying force that would 
integrate the new emerging actors such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and other established 
economic powers. Geo-strategists and realists would argue that on a grand strategic level, 
closer US – European ties, the TIPP together with the “Transpacific Partnership” (TPP), would 
enhance the West’s leverage with China. Furthermore, it would push back China’s autocratic 
capitalist model and the US and Europe would not only consolidate their status as the 
leading economies but build a political bloc of liberal democracies. 
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The American debate 
The world requires global solutions. What is the right approach? Since the end of the Bush 
administration there has been a debate among American academics on what kind of world 
will emerge. Where is Europe in this debate? Europe plays only a marginal role. The main 
concerns of American pundits are the decline of America and the rise of China. Europe is not 
considered to be a major power factor in the new world. In the best case Europe is seen as a 
natural ally because it consists of market economies and liberal democracies. In the worst 
case it is seen as irrelevant because it lacks military capacities with global reach. 
The “bipolarity” of the Cold War era is gone. George W. Bush’s “unipolarity” or Charles 
Krauthammer’s “unipolar moment” are over – if they ever existed. With the absence of a 
more suitable expression most observers uninventively speak – very general - of a 
“multipolar world” with a few world actors or players, among them the US, Europe, China 
and Russia (as is mentioned in the report of the National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 
2025). The term “multipolarity” originates from the realist school and implies polarization, 
balance of power, zero-sum, win and lose. All actors are potential enemies. Richard Haass 
(2008) rejects the polarization reference. Rather, he sees a “non-polar world” emerging. This 
highlights the necessity of common, rather than opposing, strategies, in solving global 
problems. One of the emerging measures to address global issues is the G-20. It began by 
dealing with economic, financial and climate-related questions but sooner or later it will also 
include other security topics, as was the case with the G-7/8. 
A similar observation of emerging powers has been made by Fareed Zakaria (2012) and 
Parag Khanna (2008). Zakaria sees the “rise of the rest” in a “post-American world.” Khanna 
observes the “rise of the second world,” i.e. almost all others except the US and Europe. 
Their analyses are not necessarily as declinist as Paul Kennedy’s “Rise and Fall of Great 
Powers” of 1987. For both of them the US will remain the dominant power (especially in 
military terms) but their argument is that the US will not be able to act alone. 
According to Joseph Nye (2008, 2011), in today's world, the distribution of power varies with 
the context. It is distributed in a pattern that resembles a three-dimensional chess game. On 
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the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar, and the US is likely to remain the only 
superpower for some time. But on the middle chessboard, economic power has already 
been multipolar for more than a decade, with the US, Europe, Japan, and China as the major 
players, and others gaining in importance. The bottom chessboard is the realm of cross-
border transactions that occur outside of government control. It is only the middle 
chessboard – in the economic realm - where Europe play role. 
According to John Ikenberry (2011) in new world order the US will find itself in the position 
to share power and rely in part on others. The contested and unstable US led hegemonic 
order does not destroy the American built liberal international order but rather makes it 
more inclusive. - Ikenberry does not talk of an American-European built order. - It would be 
built around rules, norms of nondiscrimination and market openness, creating for conditions 
for countries – including rising countries on the periphery of this order. Such a liberal 
international order would create a foundation in which states can engage in reciprocity and 
institutionalized cooperation. Such an order can be contrasted with closed and non-rule-
based relations like geopolitical blocs, exclusive regional spheres, or closed imperial systems. 
Charles Kupchan (2012) sees the clock running out on the West’s global dominance. Power 
will become more widely distributed around the globe. The next world will belong to no one. 
Rather, the coming world will be both multipolar and politically diverse. The diffusion of 
global power ultimately means the diffusion of international responsibility from the Atlantic 
community of democracies to a broad array of states in good standing in all quarters of the 
globe. The goal would be to forge a consensus among major states about the foundational 
principles of the next world. The rules must be acceptable to all powers. 
For Zbigniew Brzezinski (2012) American system’s capacity to compete globally depends 
increasingly on its ability to confront problems at home. If America falters, the world is 
unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor, such as China. No single power 
will be ready to exercise the role that the world expected the United States to play after the 
end of the Cold War. The US must accommodate constructively China’s rising global status 
and engage Russia and Turkey to avert global chaos. Europe remains through its cultural, 
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ideological, and economic connections and more concretely through NATO, a junior 
geopolitical partner to the United States. 
 
Liberals vs. conservatives 
The American debate about the world is very much a domestic one about America’s role in 
the world. The promotion of democracy has always been central in US foreign policy debate. 
The export of American values is not limited to liberals but the dominant principle of the 
neo-conservatives. Liberal values and democracy are hardly the only driving force (Bouchet, 
2012). The prevalent elements in US foreign policy have always been national security and 
economy interests. Representatives of the realist school are the most outspoken advocates 
of the American interests. They can be found in both the Democratic and the Republican 
Party. The same is true for liberal internationalists (Ikenberry, 2011) who also stress the 
importance of international institutions to manage interdependence and security. Liberals as 
well as conservatives focus on the reform of the domestic political and economic structure 
to reinforce the basis for a strong foreign policy. Neither liberals nor conservatives are 
monolithic groups. In each camp are those who believe that the US should not engage too 
much in the world (Posen, 2013) and those who think the US should remain a global leader, 
stay engaged and influence global and regional developments. 
Conservatives claimed greater competency when it came to security and defense and 
accused liberals of being weak on these issues. Liberals have always been caught in the 
contradiction between their own values and US-national security interests. The liberal 
foreign policy dilemma began with the presidential candidacy of McGovern in 1972, when 
among liberals a strong anti-war sentiment emerged. Since then they have been suspicious 
of any larger military involvement by the US government. For liberals in the Democratic 
Party, it was almost impossible to reclaim them. The Democrat Gary Hart, who ran for 
president in 1984 and 1988, was the last one before President Obama who attempted to do 
so. Bill Clinton focused on the economy and hesitated to use force in the Balkans, which he 
eventually did with a series of airstrikes without deploying ground troops. 
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With regards to foreign policy, liberals have traditionally preferred economic and diplomatic 
incentives, rather than resorting to force and military intervention. Barack Obama was able 
to strike a balance between those dimensions. Barack Obama’s prioritized a policy of 
multilateralism and engagement; however, the use of force has become a natural part of his 
foreign policy. In Libya, the use of force was justified on humanitarian grounds, drones were 
used for tactical strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Obama gave the final go-ahead to 
kill Osama bin Laden. At the same time, within the framework of his engagement policy, 
Obama committed himself to political solutions with rival states. During the Inaugural 
Address in January 2013 Obama rededicated himself to the engagement policy and the 
peaceful resolution of differences “not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, but 
because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear”. Obama was the first 
president who could reclaim competency on security and defense issues for the Democratic 
Party. Still, liberals struggle with high defense expenditures, with the support for 
conservative governments in Israel, and with the potential use of force against Iran. “True 
liberals” or libertarians support deep cuts in defense budgets because US Foreign Policy 
should be constrained anyway. There is some overlap with isolationists on these issues. 
Many liberals do not believe in American moral leadership because they hesitate to claim 
that America is superior to other cultures and systems. Liberals reject George W. Bush’s neo-
conservative democracy promotion with the use of force as in Iraq. They do believe, 
however, that the support of democracies all over the world is good thing. They stress the 
pull rather than the push factors. The differences are often blurred when it comes to a neo-
conservative league of democracies (Kagan, 2008, McCain) and a liberal society of 
democracies. Should such a concept replace the Security Council of the United Nations? The 
liberals are divided on this issue! More concrete, military intervention for humanitarian 
reasons might be supported by some liberals (e.g. Libya and Kosovo) or neo-conservatives 
(e.g. Syria) alike. Realist conservatives oppose humanitarian interventions. Liberal 
institutionalists and international lawyers, in contrast, request that military interventions are 
consistent with international law, either authorized by the UN-Security Council or justified by 
self-defense. 
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More general, the academic world (Kupchan, 2012) discusses a concert of powers, which 
goes back to the Democrat Franklin Roosevelt and was reinvented by the Republican Henry 
Kissinger. Such a concert would include both democracies such as the US and Europe as well 
as non-democratic powers such as Russia and China as well, but could lead to a safer peace 
and more security among world powers. 
Liberal internationalists (Ikenberry, 2011; Brooks/Ikenberry/Wohlforth, 2012/2013) argue 
that a liberal international order emerged under the US-leadership after the Second World 
War. The order is rule-based, organized around international institutions and market 
economies. The order would survive even without an US-hegemony. Liberal internationalists 
who believe in international cooperation can also be found in the Republican Party. 
Although the strategic relationships Americans formed in Europe and Asia became pillars of 
the liberal world order during the Cold War and Europe now is supposedly passé and the 
world is entering the “Asian century,” Robert Kagan (2012) believes that Americans also 
have an interest in whether the global trend is toward more democracies. It would make a 
very big difference to the future world order if the United States may eventually have to 
share global power with a richer and more powerful but also autocratic China. “The United 
States and Europe must not give up on each other.” It is not without irony that Kagan 
advised the presidential candidates McCain and Romney both of who have been very critical 
about the European social model. Kagan himself once categorized the Americans as coming 
from the Mars and ridiculed the Europeans as being from the Venus. 
However, while democracy may help political cooperation, it is not sufficient. The 
commitment to democracy is good for the citizens but no guarantee for improved 
international problem-solving. (Kupchan, 2010a, b) When it comes to nuclear weapons, 
terrorism, war and peace, crisis management, the economic crisis, carbon dioxide emissions, 
pragmatic cooperation is required, rather than ideological finger-pointing and 
intransigencies. 
 
Where is Europe?                                                                                                                             WP 69                               
Heinz Gärtner 
 
 
10 
 
 
Europe’s economic power: An American asset? 
Are traditional “transatlantic relations” that are based on a common threat, economic 
interdependence and common values better suited to address global questions, or is 
Europe’s role in the world, and specifically in relation to the US, contingent regarding its 
contribution to world affairs? Is Obama’s approach of “engaging” partners, competitors, and 
potential rivals the right approach? 
It goes without saying that economic ties can stabilize relations between the US und the EU 
and prevent bloc building. Mutual investments of European and American companies in the 
US and in Europe generate approximately ten million jobs. Both the US and Europe account 
for 50 percent of the global production and 40 percent of the global trade. (Neuss, 2009) 
Mutual direct investment (almost 60 percent of the overall investment) did not suffer during 
Bush’s unilateral foreign policy. The Eurozone accounts for 16 percent of the world exports, 
well above 8 percent for the US and 5 percent for Japan. However, Europe is economically 
engaged in Asia as well. It is China’s first and India’s second largest trading partner. China 
has also become the biggest investor in Germany. For the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Europe is also the most important commercial address. The EU is beginning 
to negotiate free trade areas with various Asian countries. (Leonard/Kundnani, 2013) 
US president Barack Obama formally endorsed a free trade partnership between the United 
States and the European Union in his State of the Union Address in February 2013. Such an 
agreement is not only about stimulating trade and investment, creating jobs, eliminating 
tariffs but also about the future of the world. Liberal internationalists see a chance to 
support a rule-based liberal world order. The agreement, the “Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership” (TTIP), could provide a further stable basis for market economies 
and liberal democracies to strengthen their global influence. Such a transatlantic partnership 
could help to enlarge their standards to the emerging powers. It could complement and 
reinforce the multilateral system, and contribute to the development of global rules. 
(Hormats, 2013) Liberal internationalists argue that down the road, the TIPP has the 
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potential to create new international standards, common bonds and shared values. On the 
one hand, it would pull them into the new system because they would want to benefit from 
the access of the new market; on the other hand, it would push them towards it because 
they will become dependent on it. Any country might join if it accepts the norms and 
principles. The US and Europe would create an economic and politically unifying force that 
would integrate the new emerging actors such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and other 
established economic powers (Hormats, 2013). Turkey has expressed its interest to 
participate in the TIPP, Brazil wants to revive an old trade-pact with Europe (The Economist, 
2013). The agreement would support efforts for similar deals with Asia and the Pacific such 
as the multilateral “Trans-Pacific-Partnership” (TPP) or the bilateral free trade agreement 
with Korea (KORUS) and Vietnam. The US is also working with Canada, Mexico, Peru and 
Chile on the eastern shore of the Pacific to negotiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 
trading partners in East Asia. (Kurata, 2013) 
The more detailed rules and standards might be very different, however. There are profound 
differences in agriculture policies such as disputes on genetically modified products, in 
labour laws, minimum wages or economic policies on deficit spending. Additionally, critics 
would say such a US – EU accord would exclude poorer nations and a global trade 
agreement involving more countries would be more desirable. Also, it would undermine the 
regulatory work of the “World Trade Organization” (WTO). 
Geo-strategists and realists would argue that on a grand strategic level, closer US – European 
ties, the TIPP, and improved cooperation of the US with Asian-Pacific states, the TPP, would 
enhance the West’s leverage with China. (Barker, 2013) It would push back China’s 
autocratic capitalist model that could dominate the world order as Kagan and others fear. 
The deal would enable the US together with Europe to set global rules to maintain their 
control over the global economic governance. The US and Europe would not only 
consolidate their status as the leading economies but build a political bloc of liberal 
democracies. 
Economic interdependence neither necessarily hinders nor helps improve political relations, 
however. It is by no means sufficient for achieving political rapprochement to solve common 
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problems. Both sides of the Atlantic remain extremely vulnerable to the economic and 
financial crisis, to climate change, proliferation, and terrorism. Economic interdependence is 
no guarantee for solving political problems. Realists even argue that interdependence is a 
cause of conflict because it increases vulnerability. Before World War I mutual trade 
relations among the later war fighting parties were stronger than trade relations between 
the US and Europe today. On the other hand, the Anglo-American economic relations 
declined before the war, while critical rapprochement occurred. (Kupchan, 2010a, b) Crises 
among the highly interdependent European powers in the decades leading up to the war 
were generally resolved without bloodshed, however. Among the less interdependent 
powers in Eastern Europe crises regularly escalated to militarized violence. (Gratzke, 2012) 
 
Europe’s political and military power: sufficient? 
The “European Union Institute for Security Studies” is not sure whether it prefers more 
“multipolarity” with the EU as a confident global actor, or more “interdependence.” 
Therefore, one author (Grevi, 2009) comes up with a mixture, the “inter-polar world”. 
The “European Council on Foreign Relations” (2009) argues that Europe’s role in the world, 
and specifically in relation to the US, is contingent regarding its contribution to world affairs. 
This is because the world requires global solutions. These global challenges include: the 
economic and financial crisis, climate change, nuclear proliferation and disarmament, 
terrorism, organized crime, pandemics. Additionally, regional conflicts like in Afghanistan, 
the Balkans, the Middle East, and Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs require 
common global involvement. 
The analyses of Europe’s global role in many ways are based on a realist scenario of powers, 
a “balance of power system” or a “global network of political and military alliances” (Kagan, 
2009) although they aren’t sufficient means to solve global problems. Global solutions are 
not based solely on military contributions. In this context, Europe’s should not be 
undervalued or ignored. 
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After all, about 70,000 European troops are deployed in various missions abroad. Europeans 
spend about half of what the US spends on defense. The austerity policies on both sides of 
the Atlantic caused cuts in military spending. This in turn led to accusations from the former 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that European countries are failing “to pull their weight” 
in military affairs. NATO responded with concepts like “smart defense” and “pooling and 
sharing” as a way to reduce costs and setting priorities. But why should Europe compete 
with the US regarding defense expenditures? They are not enemies or rivals. The EU military 
expenditures account for more than one fifth of total military spending worldwide compared 
to the US with about 45 percent. The Europeans spend twice as much on defense as Russia, 
China, India and Brazil together. Russia spends a little more than the UK or France; China 
about twice as much as Russia. (SIPRI, 2012. de Wijk, 2012) In 2000, Britain sent troops to 
Sierra Leone, and in 2002, France to Ivory Coast to suppress unrest. In Afghanistan 
Europeans lost about 1000 troops. In Bosnia and in Kosovo the Europeans provide most of 
the troops. In the missions Libya and Mali the UK and France took the lead even though they 
still lack sufficient capabilities. It is doubtful if the US would have conducted these 
operations without the European initiative, however. The EU looks like a real “military 
heavyweight.” (Hellmann, 2010) 
But the real question is what the focus of security is: “national security” to protect your 
territory; “human security” to protect individuals all over the world under conditions of 
regional destabilization, dysfunctional states, poverty, demographic changes and refugee 
flows, pandemics; or “global security” to meet challenges like global warming, nuclear 
proliferation, international terrorism. It seems that the US still concentrates more on 
“national security” and the EU more on “human and global security.” The latter, of course, 
can only be addressed cooperatively and multilaterally. 
NATO is being transformed. It no longer faces a wholesome territorial assault by Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact forces. Today it deploys its forces in support of peace and stabilization 
operations out-of-area and -continent desirably mandated by the UN. NATO after the 
Chicago summit in May 2012 will recognize that the most direct threats to the security of 
their member states are neither military nor territorial in character, like climate change, 
nuclear proliferation, terrorism, demographic transformation. At the same time NATO has 
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the huge legacy of the armed forces left over from the Cold War. It still has to figure out 
what to do with territorial defense, as defined in Article 5 of its treaty because it does not 
expect a major onslaught on Alliance territory. Its forces rather have to operate hundreds or 
even thousands of kilometers distant. NATO and the EU will have to find some division of 
labour regarding capacities and geographical fields of operation. The EU appears to focus on 
the West-Balkans and Africa while the US will concentrate on the Gulf region, the Middle 
East, the Pacific and East Asia. 
 
The Libyan and Mali examples 
Europe and European states are able to act when problems arise and common interests are 
at stake as the examples of Libya and Mali show. 
The Libyan operation of NATO was a successful US European cooperation although the US 
provided most of the intelligence, the fuelling and targeting capabilities, the surveillance and 
reconnaissance. The states of the coalition of the willing, consisting of the US and European 
countries, decided to use force to protect Libyan civilians against armed attacks by the 
Libyan regime. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 2011 emphasizes the 
responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and of the parties to 
armed conflicts “to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians.” The 
intervention met the criteria of the concept of human security because it’s the primary 
purpose was the protection of civilians from grave and systematic violations of human rights. 
For the US State Department, humanitarian reasons were the decisive factor, not potential 
military hazards, and it overruled the Pentagon, which had doubts about the military 
feasibility. There was a Security Council mandate that was being implemented by a coalition 
mainly of NATO states. In addition, the resolution has been endorsed by the Arab League. 
The United States in particular signaled that this time it renounced a unilateral approach. 
France und the UK officially took the lead. 
The Libyan intervention based on the principles of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) is an 
expression of change in the norms of state sovereignty. They have given way to the human 
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rights revolution and new ideas about a more complex array of norms concerning legitimacy 
and authority. Opposition to Bush’s Iraq war was not about the use of force as such, but 
rather about the principles and procedures for using military power. (Ikenberry, 2012, 270-
277) If there were no legitimate international competent and enduring authority, liberals in 
both governments and NGOs might want to decide for themselves if and when human rights 
were violated, and neoconservative nationalists might want to determine whether and 
where to promote democracy (with or without the use of force). Instead, both camps feel 
constrained by multilateral institutions, and may even benefit from unipolar structures. 
There is no alternative to an international order based on rules, principles and institutions. 
France’s military intervention in Mali in February 2013 demonstrated that France has the 
capability to deploy a large military force. As it the Libya’s example of 2011 showed, the EU’s 
security and defense policy is highly dependent on Britain’s and France’s military 
capabilities. France and Britain are the only EU members that are both able and willing to 
project hard power. Still, the Europeans are dependent on US support at least indirectly 
without the involvement of US troops. In Libya and Mali, the United States supplied 
intelligence, drones, fighter and refueling and transport aircraft, ammunition stocks and 
missiles to destroy air defenses. 
The US seems to accept this division of labour since the US is determined to devote more 
resources to the Pacific. But it wants the Europeans to provide more of the capabilities. It is 
not only a question of military spending but of a new philosophy. The European Armies still 
appear to prepare for a massive land invasion that more or less disappeared together with 
the Warsaw Pact. The Mali intervention once more raises the question: Under which criteria 
and conditions will European states use force with the approval of the EU? The legitimacy of 
the Libya intervention was based on the principle of R2P. In Mali, France claimed that it is 
not trying to promote democracy but to bring stability, that it is not securing resources but 
supporting the Mali government, that it is not extending Francafrique but defending 
European interests. The fact that France was acting militarily on behalf of the EU highlights 
the weakness of its “comprehensive approach” for security and development that it pursued 
in the Sahel zone since 2011. 
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The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 “Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali” (MINUSMA)1 replaces the “African-led International 
Support Mission in Mali” (AFISMA). To support political processes in Mali it covers a broad 
security-related mandate: support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of 
the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap, focusing on major population 
centers and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the 
creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of 
displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and 
peaceful elections. The broad mandate would enable the EU or some of its member-states 
to participate on various levels of the mission. 
 
Conclusions 
In the American academic debate Europe’s role in the future world is largely ignored. It is 
mainly debate about the US and China. The challenges for the US and Europe alike are 
almost all global. There are regional conflicts that involve state and non-state actors, climate 
change and resource shortages, the danger of nuclear weapons, massive human rights 
violations, criminal and terrorist organizations who also use the cyberspace. 
Traditional “transatlantic relations” that were based on a common threat are not sufficient 
to address global questions. President Barack Obama’s approach of “engaging” partners, 
competitors, and potential rivals goes beyond them. It is strength rather than weakness and 
it is a strategy for problem-solving rather than a goal in itself. In the long run, “engagement” 
can also contribute to democratization and regime change.2 
The best concept for global problem-solving could be Hillary Clinton’s “multi-partner world”, 
in place of the “multipolar world” concept. This does not mean that competition, polarity, 
and ideological differences would disappear. But it creates a level of global cooperation. 
Such attempts emerged after every major crisis: after 1815 with the “Concert of Vienna,” 
after 1918 with the “League of Nations,” after 1945 with the “United Nations,” after the 
1989/90 globalization took place (disrupted by Bush’s unilateralism). 
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We are moving towards a new world but we do not yet know what it will look like. Of course 
the US and Europe will be important actors of it but it is equally clear that traditional 
concepts will not be desirable. The new focus now is on what the US and Europe can achieve 
in the world rather than the focus on the relationship as an end in itself. 
Europe and European states are able to act once the need for action becomes obvious once 
a problem arises as the examples of Libya and Mali demonstrate. It need not be always be 
NATO or the EU but in many ways coalitions of the able and willing are more flexible and can 
act on a case-by-case basis. They can use the infrastructure provided by NATO, the EU and 
the member states. The cases of Libya and Mali made it clear that the US will increasingly 
expect contributions from allies and rely on partners when it comes to international military 
missions. (see also Gross, 2013) NATO and Europe have to accept that they have to build not 
only a European but a global security architecture. 
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Notes 
1 Resolution 2100 was adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting, on 25 April 
2013. 
2 Examples are: the improving relations of US – Chile, US – Brazil, US – Argentina, and Brazil – 
Argentina in the eighties; and also US – Philippine relations under Ferdinand Marcos. 
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